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We examine the choice between Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment at the
level of the source country. Based on a theoretical model, we predict that (1) source countries with
higher probability of aggregate liquidity crises export relatively more FPI than FDI, and (2) this effect
strengthens as the source country’s capital market transparency worsens. To test these hypotheses,
we apply a dynamic panel model and examine the variation of FPI relative to FDI for 140 source countries
from 1985 to 2004. Our key variable is the probability of an aggregate liquidity crisis, estimated from
a Probit model, as proxied by episodes of economy-wide sales of external assets. Consistent with our
theory, we find that the probability of a liquidity crisis has a strong effect on the composition of foreign
equity investment. Furthermore, greater capital market opacity in the source country strengthens the

















hui.tong@imf.org1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The liberalization of international capital markets gave rise to large amounts of international equity
ﬂows in recent years, reaching 781 billion US dollars in 2006. These ﬂows seem to have had a major
impact on the cost of capital, on the volatility of capital markets, and even on economic growth.
Representative studies establishing such results include: Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Errunza and
Miller (2000), Henry (2000), Chari and Henry (2004), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005).1
In assessing the costs and beneﬁts of the globalization of international equity markets, it is
important to take account of the composition of international equity ﬂows. These ﬂows generally
take two forms: Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) — that usually involve a control position by
the foreign investor — and Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI) — that do not involve a control
position. It is well known that these two forms of investment generate very diﬀerent implications
for the stability of international capital markets and of host countries. For example, during ﬁnancial
crises, FPI investors usually rush to liquidate their investments, whereas FDI is much more resilient
and thus contributes to the stability of the host country (see: Frankel and Rose, 1996; Lipsey, 2001;
and Sarno and Taylor, 1999).
Despite the importance of the distinction between FDI and FPI, not much is known about the
factors that guide the choice of international investors between them. Traditionally, Multinationals
engaged in FDI, while collective investment funds— private equity funds, mutual funds and hedge
funds — engaged in FPI. In such a world, investors seeking international exposure had to choose
between investing in multinationals or in investment funds. This choice inﬂuenced the composition
of equity ﬂows between FDI and FPI. More recently, the choice between FDI and FPI has become
even more direct, as collective investment funds became sources of FDI and started competing with
traditional multinationals in acquiring foreign companies.2
The goal of this paper is to shed empirical light on the factors that aﬀect the choice between
FDI and FPI at the level of the source country. Our focus is on the eﬀect of liquidity. The basic
idea is that FDI investments are illiquid and more diﬃcult to sell, and thus FPI investments become
1Stulz (2005) reviews the development of ﬁnancial globalization and its limitations.
2According to the latest 2006 World Investment Report, collective investment funds have become growing sources
of FDI. These funds raised a record amount of $261 billion in 2005, from institutional investors, such as banks,
pension funds and insurance companies. About half of the funds raised were then used towards FDI. Moreover, their
main type of FDI, cross-border M&As, reached $135 billion and accounted for as much as 19% of total cross-border
M&As in 2005.
1more desirable in the face of expected liquidity needs. To develop this hypothesis formally, we start
with a model that is based on the recent work of Goldstein and Razin (2006). In the model, the
illiquidity of FDI is derived endogenously as a result of the informational advantage possessed by
FDI investors.
More speciﬁcally, Goldstein and Razin (2006) highlight a key diﬀerence between FDI and FPI:
FDI investors are in eﬀect the managers of the ﬁrms under their control; whereas FPI investors
eﬀectively delegate decisions to managers. Consequently, direct investors are more informed than
portfolio investors regarding the prospects of their projects. This information enables direct in-
vestors to manage their projects more eﬃciently. This informational advantage, however, comes
at a cost. If investors need to sell their investments before maturity because of liquidity shocks,
the price they can get will be typically lower when buyers know that they have more information
on the fundamentals of the investment project. A key implication of the model is that the choice
between FDI and FPI will be linked to the likelihood with which investors expect to get a liquidity
shock.
To provide better link to the data, we extend the Goldstein and Razin (2006) model by making
the more realistic assumption that liquidity shocks to individual investors are triggered by some
aggregate liquidity shock. We are trying to capture the idea that individual investors are forced to
sell their investments early particularly at times when there are aggregate liquidity problems. In
those times, some individual investors have deeper pockets than others, and thus are less exposed
to the liquidity issues. Thus, once an aggregate liquidity shock occurs, some individual investors
will need to sell, but they will get a low price because buyers do not know if they have deep pockets
and sell because of adverse information or because they are truly aﬀected by the aggregate liquidity
crisis.
The main prediction of the extended model is that countries with a high probability of an
aggregate liquidity crisis will be the source of relatively more FPI and less FDI. Another prediction
is that the eﬀect of the probability of liquidity shocks on the shares of FDI and FPI is driven by
lack of transparency about the fundamentals of the investment. If the fundamentals were publicly
known, then liquidity shocks would not be that costly for direct investors, as the investors would be
able to sell the investment at fair price without bearing the consequences of the lemons problem.
Hence, the second empirical prediction is that the eﬀect of a liquidity shock on the ratio between
FPI and FDI decreases in the level of transparency in the source country.
We take these predictions to the data. A main advantage of the new speciﬁcation of the model
2is that it can be taken directly to macro data. We use negative purchase of external assets as
an indicator of an aggregate liquidity crisis. As frequently done, we estimate the probability of
a liquidity shock by using a Probit speciﬁcation. Our sample covers 140 countries from 1985 to
2004. And our measures of FDI and FPI are based on source countries’ stocks of external assets
as compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Then, we use the dynamic panel model approach
to examine the eﬀect of the crisis probability. We ﬁnd strong support for our model: a higher
probability of a liquidity crisis in the source country indeed has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the
ratio between FPI and FDI.
We further introduce a set of proxies for capital market opacity to capture the degree of asym-
metric information in the source country, including PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001) overall and
accounting opacity indexes, CIFAR (1995) accounting disclosure score, and the Global Competitive-
ness Report (1999) ﬁnancial disclosure index. We interact the opacity measure with the likelihood
of a liquidity crisis and conﬁrm that greater capital-market opacity in the source country strength-
ens the eﬀect of the crisis probability on the ratio between FPI and FDI. This illustrates that a
channel for strong institutions to aﬀect capital ﬂows is through the mitigation of the consequence
of potential liquidity shocks.3
Our results have strong implications for the future of FDI investments by collective investment
funds. These funds have expanded signiﬁcantly in the past few years due to historically low interest
rates, high liquidity of investors and the good performance of private equity funds. However,
events such as the recent subprime market turbulence and the resulting credit crunch could lead to
diﬃculties for the private equity funds in conducting FDI investments. Our results are also relevant
for the going debate on the transparency requirements for collective investment funds.4 Initiatives
to improve these funds’ transparency may increase funds’ ability to engage in FDI, as they will
then be less likely to suﬀer from the lemons problem during liquidity crises. This can be beneﬁcial
to investment funds, as FDI engagement, in the long run, is likely to generate higher returns than
FPI, due to the management eﬃciency.
Our paper is related to the vast empirical literature on international equity ﬂows. Several
papers study the determinants of FDI (including cross-border M&As) emphasizing factors such as
wealth and credit constraints, governance, mispricing, and ﬁre sales. They include: Froot and Stein
3Earlier works have emphasized the importance of host country institution on capital inﬂow. For instance, Al-
faro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2007) document that the low institutional quality, measured by host country’s
political risk, is the leading explanation of the lack of capital ﬂow from rich to poor countries.
4See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=aMS8oOJlJp0I&refer=germany
3(1991), Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002), Rossi and Volpin (2004), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005),
Albuquerque, Loayza, and Serven (2005), and Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2007). Other papers
(e.g., Griﬃn, Nardari, and Stulz, 2004; Gelos and Wei, 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2007; and Leuz,
Lins, and Warnock, 2007) study the determinants of FPI. Albuquerque (2003) studies the ratio of
FDI to FPI at the level of the host country, emphasizing expropriation risk. None of these papers
examines the eﬀect of potential liquidity crises or considers the determinants of the composition
between FDI and FPI at the level of the source country.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical model
underlying our empirical predictions. In Section 3, we describe the data and the econometric model
used for the empirical analysis. In Section 4, we present the results of the empirical analysis. Section
5 concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 Goldstein and Razin (2006): Idiosyncratic Liquidity Shocks
We start by describing the model of Goldstein and Razin (2006), with which they study a trade oﬀ
b e t w e e nF D Ia n dF P Ib a s e do nt h ee x i s t e n c eo fi d i o s y n c r a t i cl i q u i d i t ys h o c k s .
2.1.1 Eﬃciency of FDI
A small economy is faced by a continuum [0,1] of foreign investors. Each foreign investor has
an opportunity to invest in one investment project. Foreign investment can occur in one of two
forms: either as a direct investment (FDI) or as a portfolio investment (FPI). A direct investor
eﬀectively acts like a manager, whereas in case of a portfolio investment, the project is managed by
an "outsider". Investors are risk neutral, and thus choose the form of investment that maximizes
(ex-ante) expected payoﬀ.
There are three periods of time: 0, 1,a n d2.I np e r i o d0, each investor decides whether to make
a direct investment or a portfolio investment. In period 2, the project matures. The net cash ﬂow





where ε is an idiosyncratic random productivity factor, which is independently realized for each
project in period 1,a n dK is the level of capital input invested in the project in period 1, after
4the realization of ε. The productivity shock ε is distributed between −1 and 1 with mean 0.T h e
cumulative distribution function is G(·), and the density function is g(·)=G0(·). The parameter A
reﬂects production costs.
In period 1, after the realization of the productivity shock, the manager of the project observes
ε. Thus, if the investor owns the project as a direct investment, she observes ε,a n dc h o o s e sK,s o













In case of a portfolio investment, the owner is at arms length relationships with the manager,
and thus she cannot observe ε. In this case, the manager follows earlier instructions as for the level
of K. Following the logic described in Goldstein and Razin (2006), we assume that the ex-ante
instruction is chosen by the owner so as to maximize the expected return absent any information
on the realization of ε, and is based on the ex-ante 0 mean. Thus, the manager will be instructed
to choose Kp = Kd(0) = 1





Comparing (3) with (4), we see that if the project is held until maturity, it yields a higher payoﬀ
as a direct investment than as a portfolio investment. This reﬂects the eﬃciency that results from
a hands-on management style in the case of a direct investment.
2.1.2 Costs of FDI
As in Goldstein and Razin (2006), there are also costs to direct investments. We specify two types
of costs. The ﬁrst type, reﬂects the ﬁxed initial cost that an FDI investor has to incur in order
to acquire the expertise to manage the project directly. We denote this cost, which is exogenously
given in the model, by C. The second type, which is derived endogenously in the model, results
from the possibility of liquidity shocks occurring in period 1.
5Speciﬁcally, in period 1,b e f o r et h ev a l u eo fε is observed, the owner of the project might
get a liquidity shock. With the realization of a liquidity shock, the investor is forced to sell the
project immediately. We assume that the number of foreign investors is ﬁxed. We denote by λ the
probability of liquidity shocks, and assume that there are two types of foreign investors: half of
the investors face a liquidity need with probability λH, whereas the other half face a liquidity need
with probability λL,w h e r e1 >λ H > 1
2 >λ L > 0,a n dλH + λL =1 . Investors know their type ex
ante, but this is their own private information.
In addition to liquidity-based sales, there is a possibility that an investor will liquidate a project
in period 1 if she observes a low realization of ε. Because portfolio investors do not observe ε in
period 1, only direct investors sell their investment project at that time when a liquidity shock is
absent. Then, using Bayes’ Law, the price that buyers are willing to pay for a direct investment













Here, εD is a threshold level of ε, set by the direct investor; below which the direct investor is
selling the project in absence of a liquidity shock; λD is the probability, as perceived by the market,
that an FDI investor gets a liquidity shock. In (5), it is assumed that if the project is sold due to
a liquidity shock, that is, before the initial owner observes ε,t h ev a l u eo fε is not recorded in the
ﬁrms before the sale. Therefore, the buyer does not know the value of ε. However, if the project is
sold for low-proﬁtability reasons, the owner will know the value of ε after the sale.
Of course, the threshold εD is determined in equilibrium. The initial owner sets the threshold
level εD, such that given P1,D, when observing εD, she is indiﬀerent between selling and not selling






Equations (5) and (6) together determine P1,D and εD as functions of the market-perceived prob-
ability λD. We denote these functions as: εD(λD) and P1,D(λD).
The period-1 price of a portfolio investment is easier to determine. Essentially, when a portfolio
investor sells the projects in period 1, everybody knows she does it because of a liquidity shock.





6Comparing the price of FDI, which is determined by (5) and (6), with the price of FPI, which
is determined by (7), we see that the resale price of a direct investment in period 1 is always lower
than the resale price of a portfolio investment in that period (see Goldstein and Razin (2006)).
The intuition is that if a direct investor prematurely sells the investment project, the market price
must reﬂect the possibility that the sale originates from inside information on low prospects of this
investment project. This constitutes the second cost of FDI.
2.1.3 The Decision between FDI and FPI
With probability λi (i = H,L), the direct investor gets a liquidity shock, and sells the project in
period 1 for a price P1,D(λD)=
(1+εD(λD))2
2A . With probability 1 − λi, the direct investor does not
get a liquidity shock. She sells the project if the realization of ε is below εD (λD), but she does not
sell it if the realization of ε is above εD (λD). In addition, the direct investor has to incur a ﬁxed
cost of C. The (ex-ante) expected net cash ﬂow for an FDI investor is thus:



















Similarly, when the investor holds the investment as a portfolio investment, the (ex-ante) ex-





This is because, regardless whether the investor gets a liquidity shock or not, her payoﬀ is 1
2A.
We denote the diﬀerence between the expected value of FDI and the expected value of FPI by:
Diff (λi,λ D,A) ≡ EVDirect(λi,λ D,A) − EVPortfolio(A). (10)
Then, investor i will choose FDI when Diff (λi,λ D,A) > 0;w i l lc h o o s eF P Iw h e nDiff (λi,λ D,A) <
0; and will be indiﬀerent between the two (that is, may choose either FDI or FPI) when Diff (λi,λ D,A)=
0.
As is shown in Proposition 2 of Goldstein and Razin (2006), investor i is more likely to choose
FDI when the FDI cost (C) is lower; the production cost (A) is lower; the probability of getting a
liquidity shock (λi) is lower; and the market-perceived probability λD of a liquidity shock for FDI
investors is higher.
72.1.4 FDI and FPI in Equilibrium
To complete the description of equilibrium, it remains to specify how λD, the market perceived
probability that an FDI investor will get a liquidity shock, is determined. Assuming that rational
expectations hold in equilibrium, λD has to be consistent with the equilibrium choice of the two





where λH,FDI is the proportion of λH investors who choose FDI in equilibrium and λL,FDI is the
proportion of λL investors who choose FDI in equilibrium.
Goldstein and Razin (2006) show that ﬁve cases can potentially be observed in equilibrium:
Case 1: All investors choose FDI.
Case 2: λL investors choose FDI; λH investors split between FDI and FPI.
Case 3: λL investors choose FDI; λH investors choose FPI.
Case 4: λL investors split between FDI and FPI; λH investors choose FPI.
Case 5: All investors choose FPI.
Equilibrium outcomes then depend on λH and A in a way that is depicted by Figure 1. (See
Proposition 3 in Goldstein and Razin (2006).)
As we can see in the ﬁgure, the equilibrium patterns of investment are determined by the
parameters A and λH.S i n c eλH + λL =1 ,t h ev a l u eo fλH also determines λL, and thus can be
interpreted as a measure for the diﬀerence in liquidity needs between the two types of investors.
In the ﬁgure we can see that there are four thresholds — A∗, λ∗
H(A), λ∗∗
H(A),a n dλ∗∗∗
H (A) —t h a t
are important for the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes. These thresholds are deﬁned
in Goldstein and Razin (2006). Overall, we can see that as the production cost A increases, we
are more likely to observe FPI and less likely to observe FDI in equilibrium. As the diﬀerence in
liquidity needs between the two types of investors increase, we are more likely to see a separating
equilibrium, where diﬀerent types of investors choose diﬀerent forms of investment.
2.2 Aggregate Liquidity Shock
So far we followed the model in Goldstein and Razin (2006), which assumes that liquidity shocks to
individual investors are completely idiosyncratic, i.e., there is no correlation between the realization
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Outcomes
that liquidity shocks to individual investors are triggered by some aggregate liquidity shock.
Suppose now that an aggregate liquidity shock occurs in period 1 with probability q.O n c e
the shock occurs, it becomes common knowledge. Conditional on the realization of the aggregate
liquidity shock, individual investors may be subject to a need to sell their investment at period 1
with probabilities as in the previous section. That is, if a liquidity shock occurs (with probability
q) then half of the investors need to sell in period 1 with probability λH and half with probability
λL. Conditional on the realization of an aggregate liquidity shock, the realizations of individual
liquidity needs are independent of each other. With probability (1 − q), an aggregate liquidity
shock does not occur. In this case individual investors never have a liquidity need that forces them
to sell at period 1.
This speciﬁcation of the model is admittedly simple. The idea that we are trying to capture
with this speciﬁcation is that individual investors are forced to sell their investments early at times
when there are aggregate liquidity problems. In those times, some individual investors have deeper
pockets than others, and thus are less exposed to the liquidity issues. Thus, once an aggregate
liquidity shock occurs, λL investors, who have deeper pockets, are less likely to need to sell than
λH investors.
The analysis of the model under the extension to aggregate shocks is simple given the analysis
9of the model in the previous subsection. If an aggregate liquidity shock does not occur, then it is
known that no investor needs to sell in period 1 due to liquidity needs. This implies that the only
reason to sell at that time is adverse information on the proﬁtability of the project. As a result,
the market breaks down due to the well-known lemons problem (see Akerlof (1970)). Thus, when
an aggregate liquidity shock does not occur, no investor sells her investment at period 1. Investors
wait till the maturity of the investment, and get
E((1+ε)2)
2A in case they hold a FDI (see (3)) and
1
2A in case they hold a FPI (see (4)). On the other hand, if a liquidity shock does happen, the
expected payoﬀs from FDI and FPI are exactly the same as in the previous section; see (8) for FDI
and (9) for FPI. Essentially, the model in the previous section corresponds to the case of q =1 .
Using these arguments, we can write the ex-ante expected net cash ﬂow from FDI in the new
model as (we use the superscript Ext to denote expected values in the extended model:
EV Ext








































Then, the diﬀerence between the expected value of FDI and the expected value of FPI is:
DiffExt(λi,λ D,A,q) ≡ EV Ext
Direct(λi,λ D,A,q) − EV Ext
Portfolio(A). (14)
As before, investor i will choose FDI when DiffExt(λi,λ D,A,q) > 0; will choose FPI when
DiffExt(λi,λ D,A,q) < 0; and will be indiﬀerent between the two (that is, may choose either FDI
or FPI) when DiffExt(λi,λ D,A,q)=0 .
Our main goal in introducing the aggregate liquidity shock is to be able to generate a testable
empirical prediction on the relation between liquidity variables and the choice of investors between
FDI and FPI. In the original model by Goldstein and Razin (2006), the probabilities of idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks, λH and λL,a ﬀected the equilibrium allocation between FDI and FPI. The problem,
however, is that idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are not observable to econometricians. The big
advantage of the current model is that λH and λL are now linked to q — the probability of an
10aggregate liquidity shock, which is observable. Thus, our main interest is to derive a prediction on
the eﬀect that q has on the ratio of FPI to FDI and then to test it.
Repeating the analysis in Proposition 3 of Goldstein and Razin (2006) for the extended model,




H (A),j u s ta sb e f o r e . T h ed i ﬀerence is that these thresholds now depend on q. In particular,
A∗, λ∗
H(A),a n dλ∗∗
H(A) are decreasing in q,w h i l eλ∗∗∗
H (A) is increasing in q. This implies that as
the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock q i n c r e a s e s ,t h e r ew i l lb em o r eF P Ia n dl e s sF D Ii n
equilibrium.5 Thus, the ratio of FPI to FDI will increase. The intuition is that as the probability
of an aggregate liquidity shock increases, agents know that they are more likely to need to sell the
investment early, in which case they will get a low price since buyers do not know whether they
sell because of an individual liquidity need or because of adverse information on the productivity
of the investment. As a result, the attractiveness of FDI decreases. The empirical prediction is
that countries with a higher probability of liquidity shocks will be source of a higher ratio of FPI
to FDI.
2.3 The Role of Opacity
The eﬀect of liquidity shocks on the composition of foreign investment between FDI and FPI is
driven by lack of transparency about the fundamentals of the direct investment or liquidity situation
of the ﬁrms. If the fundamentals or liquidity situation were publicly known, then liquidity shocks
would not be that costly for direct investors, as the investors would be able to sell the investment
at fair price without bearing the consequences of the lemons problem.
More precisely, suppose that the source country imposes disclosure rules on its investors that
ensure the truthful revelation of investment fundamentals to the public. In such a case, FDI
investors will have to reveal the realization of ε once it becomes known to them. Then, since
potential buyers know the true value of the investment, direct investors will be able to sell their
investment at
(1+ε)2
2A . Thus, whether or not a direct investor sells the investment, he is able to extract
the value
(1+ε)2
2A , and so the expected value from investing in FDI is
E((1+ε)2)
2A − C. The expected
value from investing in FPI is 1
2A as before. This is because the kind of disclosure requirements
5Note that there is a delicate point about this result, which comes from the fact that q does not have an unam-
biguous eﬀect on the function Diff
Ext.T h ee ﬀect depends on the relation between λi and λD.T h e r e s u l t c o m e s
from the fact that Diff





H (A),a n dλ
∗∗∗
H (A) are
all derived for situations where λi ≥ λD. More details are available from the authors upon request.
11we describe here do not aﬀect the value of portfolio investments. These are requirements that are
imposed by the source country, and thus apply only for investments that are being controlled by
source-country investors.6
Analyzing the trade oﬀ between FDI and FPI under this perfect source-country transparency,
we can see two things. First, with transparency, FDI becomes more attractive than before. Second,
with transparency, the decision between FDI and FPI ceases to be a function of the probability of
a liquidity shock. This leads to our second empirical prediction: the eﬀect of the probability of a
liquidity shock on the ratio of FPI and FDI increases in the level of opacity in the source country.
3 Data and Empirical Model
3.1 Data on FPI and FDI
In the empirical application, we use the recently available data on a country’s external assets and
liabilities, as compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) assemble
a comprehensive dataset on the external assets and liabilities of 140 developed and developing
countries for the period 1970—2004. They distinguish four types of international assets: foreign
direct investment, portfolio equity investment, oﬃcial reserves, and external debt. The convention
for distinguishing between portfolio and direct investment is to see whether the ownership of shares
of companies is above or below a ten percent threshold. If it is above the threshold, then it is
classiﬁed as direct investment.7
For most countries, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) use as a benchmark the oﬃcial Interna-
tional Investment Position (IIP) estimates. However, only very few countries have consistently
reported their IIP over the period 1970—2004, with the majority of countries starting to report in
the early 1990s. For earlier years, they then work backward with data on capital ﬂows, together
with calculations for capital gains and losses, to generate estimates for stock positions. In their
6Note that this type of transparency is diﬀerent from the one studied in Goldstein and Razin (2006). In that
paper the transparency was based on host-country rules, and thus aﬀected the information investors could learn on
their portfolio investments.
7There is the problem of "borderline" cases where it is diﬃcult to classify an investment as FDI or FPI. In
countries where FPI is liberalized, a portfolio investor might buy more than 10 percent of the shares of companies
without having a "lasting interest" to control the companies. And yet that investor’s investment can be classiﬁed as
FDI. Using the control interest as a dividing line, there are circumstances where FDI can turn into FPI through the
dilution of ownership and loss of control. Conversely, FPI can be transformed into FDI, if the investor decides to
have a management interest in the companies whose assets he had earlier purchased as FPI.
12estimation, due to cross-country variation in the reliability of the data, they also employ a range of
valuation techniques to obtain the most appropriate series for each country. Particularly, they use
similar valuation adjustment for FPI and FDI (see the Appendix for more details). In our following
estimation, we use the data from 1985 to 2004 as the sample period.
Our sample includes developing countries as source countries for outward FPI and FDI. New
sources of FDI are emerging among developing and transition economies, which has been a marked
phenomenon for the past ten years. Meanwhile, multinationals from these economies are emerging
as major regional - or sometimes even global - players. The new global links these multinationals
are forging will have far-reaching repercussions in shaping the world economic landscape of the
coming decades (UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2006).
Table 1 lists the countries covered in the sample from 1985 to 2004, as a source for FPI and FDI.
We can see that developed countries have more observations on average than developing economies
do, due to the fact that developed countries engage in more foreign investment than their developing
counterparts. Table 1 also shows that developed countries tend to have higher ratio of FPI/FDI,
which may reﬂect factors other than liquidity. In the following estimation sections we will focus on
the eﬀects of the probability of liquidity crises, and the degree of country speciﬁc transparency, on
the composition of the source country external assets. We will control for standard determinants
of FPI/FDI, as well as for unobservable country ﬁxed eﬀects.8
3.2 Econometric Model
We investigate the eﬀect of a country-level liquidity shock on the FPI/FDI ratio for source countries.
The latter variable is the dependent variable in the following reduced form equation:
ln(FPI/FDI)it = αXit + β Pri,t (Liquidity Shocki,t+1)+γYeart + ui + εit (15)
for source country i at time t. ui stands for country ﬁxed eﬀect, while εit follows an i.i.d normal
distribution.
We take the log of the FPI/FDI ratio to reduce the impact of extreme values. Our selection
of control variables Xit is motivated by Faria et al (2007), where they examine the composition
of country external liabilities. They survey a set of explanatory variables, including country size,
8In principle, there could be a two-stage decision process as follows. In stage 1, a potential investor has to decide
whether to engage in foreign investment. In stage 2, in what form to do it (FDI or FPI). Some missing observations
may indicate situations where these countries did not cross the threshold for foreign investment, hence a Heckman
selection model could be desirable.
13economic development level, trade openness and ﬁnancial reform. They ﬁnd that only country size
has some explanatory power on the distribution of equity liabilities between direct investment and
portfolio equity. As no work has explicitly examined the composition of external assets, we will then
use the control variables in Faria et al (2007) as our starting point. First, we include two variables —
the log of the population and the log of GDP per capita in constant US dollars — to capture market
size and the level of economic development. We then also include trade openness, as measured by
imports plus exports over GDP, to control for the connection between trade and FDI. Furthermore,
we add the one-year lag of stock market capitalization over GDP to capture the development level
of stock market. On the one hand, a more developed stock market may have more established
professional asset management (mutual funds and hedge funds, for instance), which could help
domestic investors to enter international stock markets and therefore increase FPI outﬂow. But on
the other hand, a more developed domestic stock market may provide more opportunities at home
and hence reduce the incentive for portfolio investors to go abroad. It is then an empirical question
which eﬀect will dominate.9
Moreover, the lagged FPI/FDI may aﬀect the current FPI/FDI.10 Hence we estimate, alterna-
tively, the following dynamic panel regression.
ln(FPI/FDI)it = φln(FPI/FDI)i,t−1 +αXit +β Pri,t (Liquidity Shocki,t+1)+γYeart +ui +εit
(16)
There is a complication in estimating equation (16). That is, if εit is not i.i.d, but serially-correlated,
then ln(FPI/FDI)i,t−1 will be correlated with εit, and thus create an endogeneity problem. To
correct this problem, we will then use the Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM approach to estimate
equation (16).
9One may argue that stock market capitalization can be aﬀected by stock return and might be endogenous. Hence,
we take the one-year lag to reduce potential endogeneity. Also in robustness checks, we use an alternative measure of
stock market development, the number of listed domestic stocks, which is less sensitive to contemporary stock return
movement. And we get similar results.
10Arguably, in our model, investors can rebalance their portfolio of assets every period. Thus, the stocks of external
assets rather than the ﬂows are consistent with the model. But the choice of the stock at time t may need to use
the information set conveyed in the stock at time t − 1. Therefore, empirically, we may need to allow for the lagged
dependent variable in the equation to control for the dynamics of the information set.
143.3 Probability of Liquidity Crisis
The crux of our theory is that a higher probability of an aggregate liquidity shock (the variable
q) increases the share of FPI, relative to FDI. Therefore we include in equation (15) a variable,
Pri,t (Liquidity Shocki,t+1), to proxy for this probability, as perceived in period t.11 We emphasize
that we look at the probability of such a shock to occur irrespective of whether such a shock actually
occurs.
We deﬁne the liquidity crisis as an episode of negative purchase of external assets. The intuition
is that economy wide liquidity crises in source countries will generate a sale of many types of
external assets, such as foreign reserves, loans and equities. Hence negative purchase of external
assets can be a reasonable proxy of liquidity crises. The ﬂow data on external assets is from
the International Financial Statistics’s Balance of Payments dataset, where assets include FDI,
FPI, other investments and foreign reserves. We thus deﬁne the liquidity crisis episodes as sales of
external assets, which has a frequency of 13% in our sample of 140 countries from 1985 to 2004. The
Balance of Payments data do not control for the valuation eﬀect. Therefore, they could capture the
notion of the quantity of investment liquidations in our model. Table 2 lists the countries and years
when there is a negative purchase of external assets. It shows that besides developing countries,
some developed economies, such as Denmark, Japan, New Zealand and Spain, also experienced
liquidity crises in the sample period.











i,t+1, a latent variable, is a function of the following independent variables:
y∗
i,t+1 = Z0
itλ + ηi,t+1, (17)
where ηi,t+1 follows a standard normal distribution.
The vector Z0
it is motivated by the literature on ﬁnancial crises (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 1996).
It covers control variables from equation (15): the log of population, the log of GDP per capita,
trade openness, and stock market development. Moreover, it also includes US real interest rate,
source country political risk index, current account surplus over GDP or budget balance over GDP
11The inclusion of the liquidity shock probability is in the spirit of Razin and Rubinstein (2006), where they stress
the importance of including the probability of currency crisis in estimating the relationship between exchange rate
regime and economic growth.
15or Standard & Poor’s sovereign debt rating. Political risk index, from the International Country
Risk Guide, is based mainly on government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment proﬁle,
internal conﬂict, external conﬂict, corruption, and bureaucracy quality.12It has been linked to ﬁnan-
cial crises in earlier literature, with higher political risk making the economy vulnerable to capital
ﬂow reversals (e.g. Gelos and Wei (2005), and Broner, Gelos and Reinhart (2006)).13Standard &
Poor’s sovereign rating reﬂects the future ability and willingness of sovereign governments to service
their commercial ﬁnancial obligations in full and on time. It is based on country’s political risk,
income and economic structure, economics growth prospects, ﬁscal ﬂexibility, general government
debt structure, oﬀshore and contingent liabilities, monetary ﬂexibilities, external liquidity, and ex-
ternal debt burden. Hence it can be regarded as a summary of other control variables in Z0
it .
When sovereign rating declines, the country will have diﬃculty in borrowing and hence a potential
liquidity crunch.
To identify β in equation (15), the exclusion restriction needs to be satisﬁed. That is, there needs
to be at least one variable that is correlated with y∗
i,t+1 in equation (17) but uncorrelated with εit in
equation (15). We argue the following variables can satisfy the exclusion restriction: political risk
index, current account surplus over GDP, and budget surplus over GDP. Our theory does not suggest
their inclusion in equation (15). And we are not aware of other models where they directly inﬂuence
the composition of capital outﬂows. In earlier literatures, institutional factors, such as political
risks, have been applied to the host country FDI conﬁscation considerations (Albuquerque (2003)
and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2007)). These conﬁscation considerations, however,
is more about host country than about source country. Current account or budget surplus may
indirectly aﬀect the FPI/FDI composition through aﬀecting exchange rate, which may generate
some wealth eﬀect and inﬂuence FDI and FPI asymmetrically as in Froot and Stein (1991). Froot
and Stein (1991) model operates via a wealth eﬀect in the host country. Because of frictions in
control that exist in FDI but not in FPI, wealth is important only for FDI. Thus a rise in host-
country wealth, from the appreciation of its real exchange rate, will increase its FDI inﬂow, while
having no impact on its FPI receipts. One could potentially extend their model to source countries
with the prediction that real exchange rate appreciation may increase FDI outﬂow, relative to FPI
outﬂow. Hence we will include a control variable for the wealth eﬀe c ti ne q u a t i o n( 1 5 ) ,i . e . ,t h e
12See http://www.prsgroup.com/commonhtml/ methods.html# _International_Country_Risk.
13Lower political risk has also been shown to reduces the cost of capital (e.g. Harvey (2004)) and the credit spread
(e.g. Eichengreen, Kletzer, and Mody (2003)).
16lagged real exchange rate appreciation.14 With the wealth eﬀect controlled for, there is unlikely




We use the pooled speciﬁcation to predict the liquidity crisis as in the literature on ﬁnancial
crises (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 1996), because Probit models with ﬁxed eﬀects do not provide
consistent estimators due to the incidental parameters problem (Greene, 2002).15 Table 3 presents
the Probit estimations. Case1 (Column 1) examines all countries from 1985 to 2004, subject to
data availability on control variables. We ﬁnd that larger economic size, higher development level,
and trade openness all lower the occurrence of liquidity crises. Meanwhile, higher U.S. interest
rate, higher political risk and smaller current account surplus increase the probability of crises.16
The predicted crisis probability ranges between 0.01 and 0.57, with an average of 0.19.
In Case 2, we focus on countries with stock markets, which are the main players behind foreign
portfolio investments. This shrinks our sample size by 45%. Still we ﬁnd similar results as in
Column 1. The predicted crisis probability now ranges from 0.01 to 0.77, with an average of 0.11.
In Case 3, we substitute the current account surplus on the external side with the budget surplus
on the domestic side. We ﬁnd that higher budget surplus is associated with smaller probability of
crisis. In Column 4, we use the Standard and Poor’s sovereign rating instead. When the sovereign
rating is poor, government, banks and non—ﬁnancial ﬁrms will ﬁnd it more expensive to borrow
abroad and therefore compete for domestic resources, creating upward pressure on interest rates.
The inclusion of sovereign rating reduces the sample size by 30%, owing to the smaller country
coverage. We ﬁnd that higher sovereign rating signiﬁcantly reduces the likelihood of crisis.17
14We will examine it in more details in the section on sensitivity tests.
15Probit models rely on Ti increasing for the ﬁxed eﬀects to be consistently estimated. But in our model, Ti is
both small and ﬁxed. Hence, the estimated ﬁxed eﬀects are not consistent estimators. However, the estimator of β
is a function of the estimators of the ﬁxed eﬀects, which means that the estimation of β will not be consistent either.
16The R-square of the Probit estimation is 0.09. Arguably, it is not large. We use Probit to test the hypothesis
that the probability of crises matters, but we are not too concerned about the degree of ﬁtness of the Probit, as long
as it is an unbiased estimate of the probability.
17We use the numeric representation of the rating, with smaller number corresponding to higher risk, i.e. worse
rating.
174.2 Ratio of FPI to FDI
With the predicted crisis probabilities from Table 3, we can now estimate equations (15) and (16).
The results are reported in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 present the estimations with pure country
ﬁxed eﬀects (i.e., no dynamic feedback). We start with the predicted probability as the only
explanatory variable. As our theory predicts, a higher probability of liquidity shocks signiﬁcantly
increases the share of FPI outﬂow relative to FDI. A 1% rise of the crisis probability will increase
the ratio of FPI stock over FDI stock by 3%. Column 2, with more control variables, conﬁrm the
results in Column 1. It also suggests that trade openness complements FDI outﬂow.
Columns 3 and 4 report dynamic panel estimations. Dynamic estimation reduces the sample
size, but reassuringly, higher probability of liquidity shocks still increases FPI relative to FDI.
We also ﬁnd that the lagged FPI/FDI ratio is associated with the current FPI/FDI ratio. The
coeﬃcient of the lagged FPI/FDI is 0.73, which suggests that there is no panel unit root process
for ln(FPI/FDI). Additional Arellano-Bond tests fail to reject the hypothesis of no second-order
autocorrelation. That is, the estimations in Columns 3 and 4 are valid estimations To examine
whether there is nonlinearity, we also add the square of the predicted probability as an additional
explanatory variable. The square term is not signiﬁcant in either the pure ﬁxed eﬀect estimation
or the dynamic panel estimation.
The above results could also be consistent with models that are not based on information
asymmetry but on pure transaction cost or market depth. FPI tends to be easier to liquidate than
FDI. For example, to liquidate FDI, it may take longer to ﬁnd buyers who know the sectors and are
willing to take over the management. But to liquidate FPI, it will not be diﬃcult to sell stocks to
other portfolio investors in a deep stock market. If an investor foresees a liquidity crisis and the need
to liquidate assets, he may then choose FPI instead. This argument is based on pure transaction
cost without involving information asymmetry. As our theoretical model is based on asymmetric
information, we have a second layer of testable predictions that the above counter arguments lack.
That is, liquidity shocks will interact with source-country capital market transparency to inﬂuence
the FPI/FDI composition. We now test this prediction.
4.3 Capital Market Opacity in Source Country
A key prediction of our theoretical model is that the higher is the opacity in the source country,
the higher is the impact of the probability of liquidity shocks on FPI/FDI. Hence, we estimate the
18following equation
ln(FPI/FDI)it = φln(FPI/FDI)i,t−1 + αXit + β0 Pri,t (Liquidity Shocki,t+1)+
β1Opacityi ∗ Pri,t (Liquidity Shocki,t+1)+γYeart + ui + εit (18)
We expect to see a positive value of β1. Note that the opacity index itself is excluded as an
explanatory variable, as it is time-invariant and therefore imbedded in country ﬁxed eﬀects. In this
section, we focus on countries where stock markets are present, hence our Probit prediction of crisis
i sb a s e do nt h ec o e ﬃcients in Case 2 of Table 3, although results were similar if based on Case 1
of Table 3.
In our theoretical model, the opacity is related to either the fundamentals of the project or the
liquidity situation of investors. We now introducear i c hs e to fi n d e x e st h a tc a p t u r et h ed e g r e eo f
opacity about investors’ liquidity, and to some extent, the underlying projects. We start with the
disclosure score from Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (1995), which ex-
amines ﬁrm-level annual reports for the omission or inclusion of 90 accounting items in 41 countries
for the year of 1993. The score is related to ﬁrm’s incomes, cash ﬂows and balance sheets, which
cover ﬁrm’s liquidity and operations. It ranges from 56 to 85, with higher score associated with
better corporate disclosure. It has been applied in prior studies (La Porta et al. (1998), Rajan
and Zingales (1998), and Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004)). We use 100 minus the original
CIFAR transparency index to arrive at the CIFAR opacity index (Appendix Table 1), and apply it
in equation (18). Again we estimate both the pure ﬁxed-eﬀect model and the dynamic panel. We
ﬁnd that the interaction term of opacity and crisis probability has a positive coeﬃcient (Columns
1 and 2 of Table 5), hence higher opacity increases the eﬀect of crisis probability on the FPI/FDI
composition.18
Our second opacity index comes from Kurtzman, Yago and Phumiwasana (2004), which fol-
lows the methodology of PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001) Opacity Index but expands the country
coverage from 35 to 48. The index measures opacity based on ﬁve standards-related dimensions—
corruption, eﬃcacy of the legal system, deleterious economic policy, inadequate accounting and
governance practices, and detrimental regulatory structures. We use both its overall opacity index
(OPA) and its accounting subcomponent (ACC), with higher index associated with lower trans-
18Sample sizes in Table 5 tend to be smaller than those in Tab l e4 ,a ss o m es o u r c ec o u n t r i e sa r en o tc o v e r e db yt h e
various opacity indexes.
19parency (Appendix Table 2).19The original PricewaterhouseCoopers 2001 Opacity Index has been
applied in Gelos and Wei (2005), where the authors study how host country transparency aﬀects
international investors’ portfolio holdings. We report the estimation of equation (18) with the ac-
counting opacity index in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, and with the overall opacity in Columns 5
and 6. All the estimations suggest that higher opacity strengthens the eﬀect of the crisis probability
on the FPI/FDI choice.
Our fourth proxy of opacity is from the Global Competitiveness Report (1999) published by
the World Economic Forum. The Report surveys over 3,000 executives about their perceptions of
the ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial disclosure in the country where they operate. The respondents were asked
to assess the validity of the statement “The level of ﬁnancial disclosure required is extensive and
detailed" with a score from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) for 58 countries. We use 8
minus the original value to construct our proxy of opacity (GCR, Appendix Table 3). This proxy for
corporate opacity has also been applied previously in Gelos and Wei (2005). The regression results
in Columns 7 and 8 of Table 5 again suggest that opacity increases the impact of the predicted
liquidity crisis.
Hence, we conﬁrm the importance of the interplay of asymmetry information and liquidity
shocks on the capital ﬂow composition by applying a rich set of opacity proxies. Certainly, those
proxies are correlated, even though they are based on diﬀerent years and criteria (subjective or
objective). Appendix 4 list the correlations among them, with the correlations ranging from 0.24
to 0.78.
So far, the predicted probability of crisis is based on the Probit estimation in Column 2 of
Table 3. Now, we use an alternative prediction of crisis probability based on Column 3 of Table
3, where we replace current account surplus with budget surplus in the Probit equation. The
regression results with the new crisis probability are reported in Table 6. Reassuringly, the pattern
of results in Table 5 still carry over, with similar signs and signiﬁcance levels. We further apply
another measure of crisis probability based on Column 4 of Table 3, where Standard and Poor’s
sovereign rating replaces current account surplus. The new results are reported in Table 7. The
average sample size now is around 15% less than that in Table 5. But again, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
19Its accounting subcomponent is based on the following survey questions: Have exchanges established disclosure
requirements?Are large shareholders required to disclose ownership? Are annual reports available to the public on
demand? Are public corporations’ ﬁnancial statements required to be reviewed by an external auditor? Are the
country’s accounting standards on disclosure in accordance with International Accounting Standards? And must
ﬁrms account for ﬁnancial assets at fair market value?
20impacts of opacity, similar to those in Table 5. Hence, these alternative crisis probabilities assure
us that our key results related to liquidity and opa c i t ya r en o td r i v e nb yac e r t a i nf u n c t i o n a lf o r m
or speciﬁcation of the Probit.
4.4 More Sensitivity Checks
In this section, we look at several variations of the panel estimation of equation (18). We start
with adding more variables into equation (18) to tackle potential omitted variable problems. Our
ﬁrst addition is a variable controlling for the eﬀect of wealth on FDI. According to Froot and Stein
(1991), and Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2007), higher source country’s wealth could signiﬁcantly
boost FDI outﬂow, as it provides cheaper ﬁnancing. Froot and Stein (1991) use the appreciation of
exchange rate to proxy for cheaper ﬁnancing, while Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2007) use the stock
market’s market to book ratio. As the data on exchange rate has more country coverage than the
market/book ratio, we will then use the real exchange rate to proxy for the wealth of source country.
We reexamine Table 5 and report the new results in Table 8. The sample size is now reduced by
around 10% in some cases. We ﬁnd that the appreciation of the real exchange rate increases the FDI
more than for the FPI, consistent with Froot and Stein (1991). More importantly, our key results
on liquidity and opacity is still present. We also add the lagged real exchange rate appreciation
into the Probit estimation of crisis, but it turns out to be insigniﬁcant. Another control variable
we add is the Chinn and Ito (2007) measure of ﬁnancial openness. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
eﬀect for it on either the crisis probability or the FPI/FDI composition.
Secondly, we have so far excluded opacity itself as an explanatory variable, because time-
invariant opacity indicators are already imbedded in country ﬁxed eﬀects. As a sensitivity check,
we drop country ﬁxed eﬀects and add opacity indexes as control variables. We ﬁnd that the
interaction term of opacity and crisis probability is still positive for all opacity indexes, and is
diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level for two indexes (OPA and GCR).
Thirdly, we substitute the predicted probability of crisis with the actual occurrence of liquidity
crisis at t +1 . Evidently, this may create some endogeneity issues in estimation. But it can still
serve as useful checks, particularly if there is some concerns about the forecasting power of Probit
models. The dynamic panel estimation results are presented in Table 9, with four proxies of opacity
( O P A ,A C C ,C I F A R ,a n dG C R ) .A g a i n ,t h e r ew eﬁnd that the occurrence of liquidity crises at t+1
increases the ratio of FPI to FDI. Moreover, the impact becomes larger for source countries with
opaque capital markets.
21Finally, we use the one-year lags of FPI stock (log) and FDI stock (log) as explanatory variables,
rather than the lag of the FPI/FDI ratio. We ﬁnd that the lagged FPI is positively associated with
the FPI/FDI ratio, while the lagged FDI is negatively associated with the FPI/FDI ratio. More
importantly, the probability of crises still has signiﬁcant impacts as in Table 5.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examine how the fear of liquidity shocks guides international investors in choosing
between FPI and FDI. We start by presenting a model in the spirit of Goldstein and Razin (2006).
In this model, FDI investors control the management of the ﬁrms; whereas FPI investors delegate
decisions to managers. Consequently, direct investors are more informed than portfolio investors
about the prospects of projects. This information enables them to manage their projects more
eﬃciently. However, if investors need to sell their investments before maturity because of liquidity
shocks, the price they can get will be lower when buyers know that they have more information on
investment projects. We extend the Goldstein and Razin (2006) model by making the assumption
that liquidity shocks to individual investors are triggered by some aggregate liquidity shock. A key
prediction then is that countries that have a high probability of an aggregate liquidity crisis will
be the source of more FPI and less FDI. Another prediction is that this eﬀect will be strong only
when the transparency in the source country is weak.
To test this hypothesis, we apply a dynamic panel model to examine the variation of FPI
relative to FDI for 140 source countries from 1990 to 2004. We use episodes of negative purchase
of external assets as a proxy for liquidity crises. Using a Probit speciﬁcation, we estimate the
probability of liquidity crises for each country and in every year of our sample. Then, we test
the eﬀect of this probability on the ratio between FPI and FDI generated by the source country.
We ﬁnd strong support for our model: a higher probability of a liquidity crisis, measured by the
probability of episodes of negative purchase of external assets, has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
the ratio between FPI and FDI. Moreover, higher opacity in the source country accelerates the
eﬀect of the probability of liquidity shock on FPI/FDI. Hence, liquidity shocks seem to have strong
eﬀects on the composition of foreign investment, as predicted by our model.
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6 Appendix: The Valuation Adjustment for the Stock of FDI and
FPI Assets
For FPI assets, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) use the following method to calculate the market











where EQASt−1 is the market value of the stock at the end of t−1; EQAFt is the ﬂow during the
year t; pMS
t is the Morgan Stanley Composite Index of world stock markets at the end of t;a n d
¯ pMS
t is the average Morgan Stanley composite index during year t.
For FDI assets, they use a diﬀerent method to account for the valuation eﬀect. The IMF’s
dataset of International Investment Position (IIP) provide book-value estimates of FDI stock for
the majority of countries, and market-value estimates for a relatively small number of countries.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) complement the IIP dataset with valuation changes designed to
capture shifts in relative prices across countries. Here is how they do it:
• For market-value series of FDI stock in IIP, they adjust stock positions for shifts in stock
market price indices (i.e,p MS
t ), same as their adjustment method for FPI. However, only France,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the U.S. provide market value series.
• F o rb o o k - v a l u es e r i e so fF D Is t o c ki nI I P ,t h e ym a i n l yu s et h i sm e t h o d : c u m u l a t i v eﬂows
adjusting outstanding holdings for ﬂuctuations in real exchange rates. They ﬁrst assume that the
investment pattern of a country reﬂects its trade pattern. Their adjustment then is to account
for the impact of changes in the exchange rates of the countries where the investment takes place





26where FDIASt−1 is the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)’s adjusted market value of FDI stock at






where pc stands for partner countries, us for the U.S., cpix is the consumer price index of country
x and e
pc
$ is the dollar / partner countries’ nominal exchange rate. Let us look at Italy’s FDI asset
as an example. Suppose that Italy only has FDI in Germany and France, then pc stands for the
combination of France and Germany, weighted by these two countries’ trade with Italy. One can
verify that rerpc actually is the ratio between the CPI-based real exchange rate of the country
(Italy) vis-a-vis the US and the CPI-based real eﬀective exchange rate (Italy vis-a-vis trading
partners).
Hence, in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), the adjustment for FDI in book value is diﬀerent
from the adjustment for FPI. Will this signiﬁcantly aﬀect our estimation model in the main text?
It is unlikely, because:
First, we are looking at source country rather than host country. For FPI assets, the adjustment
factor, pMS
t , is the global stock return, which does not vary across source countries. Hence, as long
as we include year eﬀects, we will fully capture the eﬀect of pMS
t .
Secondly, rerpct, essentially reﬂects the price relationship (CPI and exchange rate) between
Italy’s trading partners and the US. It is unlikely to be aﬀected much by the liquidity crisis in the
source country. That is, a crisis in Italy is unlikely to change much the relative price between the
combination of Italy’s trading partners (France, Germany, China, Canada, U.S., etc.) and the U.S.
Note that if the U.S. itself is a large trading partner of Italy, then rerpct will change very little. In
the extreme case where the U.S. is the only trading partner, rerpct will be equal to 1.A n di nt h e
case where there is a world-wide contagion, again it will be captured by our year dummies.
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Table 1:  Ratio of FPI to FDI: Summary Statistics 
Country Name   Obs  Mean  Country Name   Obs  Mean 
United States  20  -0.88  Hong Kong S.A.R.   7  -1.22 
United  Kingdom  20 -0.13  India  19 -0.73 
Austria 20  -0.30  Indonesia 4  -4.51 
Denmark  20 -0.78  Korea  20 -2.26 
France  20 -1.46  Malaysia  20 -2.15 
Germany 20  -0.48  Pakistan  3  -2.51 
Italy  20 -0.59  Philippines  20 -0.12 
Netherlands  20 -0.73  Singapore  20 0.04 
Norway  20 -0.94  Thailand  18 -3.21 
Sweden  20 -1.50  Botswana  11 -0.16 
Switzerland  20  -0.11  Congo, Republic of  10  0.30 
Canada 20  -0.05  Benin  9  -3.63 
Japan 20  -0.72  Gabon  7  -2.98 
Finland  20 -2.54  Côte  d'Ivoire  19 0.06 
Greece 19  -0.41  Kenya 20  -3.65 
Iceland  14 -0.24  Libya  20 2.91 
Ireland 20  0.97  Mali  8  -3.66 
Malta 11  -1.39  Mauritius  6  -1.38 
Portugal 20  -0.11  Morocco  3  -2.08 
Spain 20  -1.25  Niger  8  -5.38 
Turkey 17  0.73  Rwanda  6  -0.33 
Australia  20 -0.71  Senegal  20 -1.41 
New  Zealand  17 -0.94  Namibia  14 0.65 
South  Africa  20 -0.94  Swaziland  13 -3.94 
Argentina  20 0.44  Togo  17 -1.47 
Brazil  20 -3.25  Tunisia  20 2.20 
Chile 20  0.32  Armenia  8  -1.58 
Colombia 20  -0.86 Belarus  8  -1.13 
Costa Rica  10  -1.04  Kazakhstan 6  -0.28 
Dominican  Republic  9 -0.54  Bulgaria  8 -0.52 
El Salvador  4  0.58  Moldova  11  -3.99 
Mexico  20 -0.28  Russia  11 -4.40 
Paraguay  20 -3.24  China,P.R.:  Mainland  17 -3.25 
Peru 20  0.88  Ukraine  9  -0.37 
Uruguay 17  -0.22  Czech Republic  12  0.33 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  20  -0.81  Slovak Republic  10  1.28 
Trinidad and Tobago  10  -2.32  Estonia  11  -2.00 
Bahrain  20 0.58  Latvia  11 -1.20 
Cyprus 6  0.04  Hungary  14  -1.88 
Israel  20 -0.10  Lithuania  12 -1.47 
Jordan  8 1.79  Croatia  8 -3.11 
Saudi  Arabia  13 -0.89  Slovenia  11 -2.79 
Egypt  8 -0.16  Macedonia  7 2.01 
Bangladesh  5 -3.17  Poland  7 -1.97 
Cambodia  8 -0.09  Romania  7 -2.86 
Note: Table 1 presents the average of the log of FPI stock over FDI stock for 90 source countries for the period from 1985 
to 2004. Obs is the number of non-missing observations for each source country. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).     
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Table 3: Probit Estimation of Liquidity Crises 
 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
Population, log  -0.090***  -0.12**  -0.16***  -0.15** 
 [0.031]  [0.054]  [0.053]  [0.073] 
GDP per capita, log  -0.12***  -0.17***  -0.26***  -0.21* 
 [0.034]  [0.065]  [0.067]  [0.12] 
US real interest rate  0.10***  0.12***  0.12***  0.12** 
 [0.027]  [0.038]  [0.039]  [0.048] 
Trade openness  -0.12  -0.22  -0.29*  -0.21 
 [0.086]  [0.15]  [0.15]  [0.19] 
Political risk  0.015*** 0.014**  0.0086  0.0011 
 [0.0034]  [0.0061]  [0.0064]  [0.011] 
Number of listed stocks    0.13**  0.12**  0.11 
   [0.051]  [0.054]  [0.079] 
Current Account /GDP  -0.015***  -0.048***     
 [0.0053]  [0.010]     
Budget Surplus/GDP      -0.031**   
     [0.015]   
S&P country rating        -0.17** 
       [0.072] 
Constant 2.30***  2.88*  4.25***  3.64 
 [0.8]  [1.6]  [1.6]  [2.3] 
Observations 1851  1028  971  671 
R-squared 0.09  0.11  0.08  0.12 
 
Note: Table 3 estimates the probability of liquidity crises for countries over the period 1985-2004. The 
dependent variable is the liquidation of source country’s foreign asset. Political risk indexes is from ICRG, 
country rating is from Standard and Poor’s, while all other variables are from the WDI. A pooled Probit 
regression is estimated. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Determinants of FPI over FDI 
 
  Fixed Effect 
 
Fixed Effect  Dynamic Panel  Dynamic Panel 
Prob of Liquidity Crisis at t+1  3.06***  2.53**  1.88***  0.81 
 [0.85]  [1.20]  [0.65]  [0.94] 
Population, log    -1.99***    -1.53** 
   [0.77]    [0.68] 
GDP per capita, log    -0.49    -0.23 
   [0.36]    [0.29] 
Stock capitalization/GDP    0.045    0.018 
   [0.040]    [0.033] 
Trade openness    -0.55**    -0.33* 
   [0.22]    [0.17] 
Log(FPI/FDI), lag      0.77***  0.73*** 
     [0.028]  [0.030] 
Observations 1135  849  1023  737 
Number of countries  89  78  84  75 
R-squared 0.08  0.1     
 
Note: The estimated probability of liquidity crisis is based on the estimates from Table 3 (Case 1). The 
dependent variable is the log of FPI stock over FDI stock, for source countries from 1985 to 2004. All other 
explanatory variables are from the WDI. Cases 1 and 2 are estimations with country and year fixed effects. 
Cases 3 and 4 add the one-year-lagged dependent variable to estimates a dynamic panel model. Standard 
errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Determinants of FPI over FDI-Opacity 
 
  CIFAR CIFAR  ACC  ACC  OPA  OPA  GCR  GCR 
  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic 
Population, log  -5.76***  -1.17***  -4.46***  -0.87**  -4.00*** -0.6  -4.97*** -2.01*** 
  [0.82]  [0.38] [0.76]  [0.43] [0.76]  [0.43] [0.77]  [0.54] 
GDP per capita, log  -1.47***  -0.50**  -0.25  -0.099  -0.34  -0.17  -0.18  -0.23 
  [0.47]  [0.21] [0.36]  [0.19] [0.36]  [0.19] [0.37]  [0.23] 
Stock capitalization/GDP  -0.047  -0.078**  -0.039 -0.066**  -0.02  -0.052*  -0.037 -0.044 
 [0.073]  [0.032]  [0.048]  [0.029]  [0.047] [0.029]  [0.045] [0.031] 
Trade  openness  -0.2  -0.042  -0.24  -0.15 -0.17  -0.12 -0.27  -0.26* 
  [0.29]  [0.12] [0.24]  [0.12] [0.24]  [0.12] [0.24]  [0.15] 
Log(FPI/FDI),  lag    0.85***   0.84***   0.84***   0.71*** 
    [0.019]   [0.022]   [0.022]   [0.024] 
Prob of liquidity crisis at t+1  -9.97***  -1.22  -6.21*** -2.58**  -12.6*** -6.19***  -12.7*** -3.85* 
  [2.87]  [1.22] [2.36]  [1.20] [3.17]  [1.64] [3.49]  [2.20] 
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(CIFAR)  0.27***  0.042           
  [0.077]  [0.033]           
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(ACC)     0.16**  0.079**       
     [0.067]  [0.035]       
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(OPA)        0.28***  0.14***     
        [0.072]  [0.037]     
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(GCR)           4.03***  1.24* 
           [1.11]  [0.70] 
Observations  520  476 587  528 587  528 669  599 
Number  of  countries  36  36 44  44 44  44 52  52 
R-squared  0.18     0.12     0.13     0.14    
 
Note: The estimated probability of liquidity crisis is based on the estimates from Table 3 (Case 2). The dependent variable is 
the log of FPI stock over FDI stock for source countries from 1985 to 2004. The Overall Opacity Index (OPA) and the 
Accounting (ACC) Opacity Index are constructed in 2004 by Kurtzman Group. The opacity index (CIFAR, 1993) is from the 
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. The opacity index (GCR, 1999) is from the annual Global 
Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum. All other explanatory variables are from the WDI. Standard errors in 
brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Determinants of FPI over FDI-Opacity 
(With Alternative Estimation of Crisis Probability) 
 
  CIFAR CIFAR  ACC  ACC  OPA  OPA  GCR  GCR 
  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic 
Population, log  -6.51***  -1.22***  -5.56***  -1.13** -4.72***  -0.90** -5.15***  -2.15*** 
  [0.79] [0.38]  [0.78] [0.45]  [0.76] [0.43]  [0.75] [0.54] 
GDP per capita, log  -1.91***  -0.48**  -0.034  -0.014  -0.12  -0.055  -0.16  -0.13 
  [0.47] [0.21]  [0.38] [0.20]  [0.38] [0.19]  [0.38] [0.23] 
Stock capitalization/GDP  -0.066  -0.076***  -0.067  -0.080*** -0.059  -0.076*** -0.046  -0.053* 
  [0.063] [0.029]  [0.045] [0.027]  [0.045] [0.027]  [0.043] [0.029] 
Trade  openness  -0.28 -0.1  -0.17 -0.12  -0.062  -0.058 -0.31 -0.23 
  [0.26] [0.12]  [0.23] [0.12]  [0.23] [0.12]  [0.23] [0.14] 
Log(FPI/FDI),  lag   0.84***   0.83***   0.83***   0.70*** 
   [0.020]   [0.022]   [0.022]   [0.024] 
Prob of Liquidity Crisis at t+1  -26.2***  -2.05  -11.5***  -2.72  -17.1***  -6.84***  -16.1***  -6.15** 
  [4.04] [1.82]  [3.26] [1.72]  [4.63] [2.32]  [4.27] [2.66] 
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(CIFAR)  0.62***  0.058           
  [0.10]  [0.045]           
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(ACC)     0.32***  0.10**       
     [0.084]  [0.045]       
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(OPA)        0.38***  0.18***    
        [0.10]  [0.050]    
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(GCR)           4.87***  2.17*** 
           [1.32]  [0.82] 
Observations  519 475  573 516  573 516  668 598 
Number  of  countries  36 36  43 43  43 43  52 52 
R-squared  0.24     0.15   0.15   0.15  
 
Note: The estimated probability of liquidity crisis is based on the estimates from Table 3 (Case 3). The dependent variable is the 
log of FPI stock over FDI stock for source countries from 1985 to 2004. The Overall Opacity Index (OPA) and the Accounting 
(ACC) Opacity Index are constructed in 2004 by Kurtzman Group. The opacity index (CIFAR, 1993) is from the Center for 
International Financial Analysis and Research. The opacity index (GCR, 1999) is from the annual Global Competitiveness 
Report by the World Economic Forum. All other explanatory variables are from the WDI. Standard errors in brackets; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
     
  34
 
Table 7: Determinants of FPI over FDI-Opacity 
(With Alternative Estimation of Crisis Probability) 
 
  CIFAR CIFAR  ACC  ACC  OPA  OPA  GCR  GCR 
  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic 
Population, log  -5.04***  -0.90**  -5.20***  -1.31***  -4.47*** -0.90**  -4.48*** -1.83*** 
  [0.82]  [0.38] [0.74]  [0.42] [0.75]  [0.42] [0.77]  [0.52] 
GDP per capita, log  -0.41  -0.44**  0.62*  0.023  0.36  -0.09  0.38  0.0069 
  [0.48]  [0.21] [0.35]  [0.18] [0.35]  [0.18] [0.36]  [0.22] 
Stock  capitalization/GDP  0.16**  -0.032 0.12**  -0.039 0.17***  -0.025 0.16***  0.03 
 [0.068]  [0.031]  [0.059]  [0.032]  [0.060] [0.032]  [0.053] [0.034] 
Trade  openness  0.28 0.0022  0.39*  -0.049  0.29 -0.069  -0.0054  -0.18 
  [0.27]  [0.12] [0.23]  [0.12] [0.24]  [0.12] [0.24]  [0.15] 
Log(FPI/FDI),  lag    0.86***   0.81***   0.82***   0.64*** 
    [0.023]   [0.026]   [0.026]   [0.028] 
Prob of Liquidity Crisis at t+1  -15.6***  -2.17  -18.3***  -8.93***  -14.9***  -7.95***  -16.1***  -6.72** 
  [4.16]  [1.89] [3.56]  [1.93] [5.33]  [2.82] [4.50]  [2.99] 
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(CIFAR)  0.42***  0.03           
  [0.11]  [0.051]           
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(ACC)     0.58***  0.26***       
     [0.098]  [0.053]       
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(OPA)        0.36***  0.18***     
        [0.11]  [0.061]     
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(GCR)           4.90***  2.29*** 
           [1.28]  [0.85] 
Observations  441  402 492  441 492  441 567  506 
Number  of  countries  35  35 43  43 43  43 51  51 
R-squared  0.26     0.27     0.23     0.22    
 
Note: The estimated probability of liquidity crisis is based on the estimates from Table 3 (Case  4). The dependent variable is the 
log of FPI stock over FDI stock for source countries from 1985 to 2004. The Overall Opacity Index (OPA) and the Accounting 
(ACC) Opacity Index are constructed in 2004 by Kurtzman Group. The opacity index (CIFAR, 1993) is from the Center for 
International Financial Analysis and Research. The opacity index (GCR, 1999) is from the annual Global Competitiveness 
Report by the World Economic Forum. All other explanatory variables are from the WDI. Standard errors in brackets; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8: Determinants of FPI over FDI-Opacity 
-Alternative Panel 
 
  CIFAR CIFAR  ACC  ACC  OPA  OPA  GCR  GCR 
  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic  Fixed Dynamic 
Population, log  -5.37*** -1.07***  -4.43*** -0.75*  -4.04*** -0.49  -4.81*** -2.15*** 
  [0.82] [0.36]  [0.78] [0.40]  [0.78] [0.41]  [0.77] [0.47] 
GDP per capita, log  -1.93*** -0.51**  -0.5  -0.16  -0.57  -0.2  -0.51  -0.27 
  [0.47] [0.20]  [0.38] [0.19]  [0.37] [0.18]  [0.38] [0.21] 
Stock capitalization/GDP  -0.026 -0.097***  -0.0036  -0.066** 0.014  -0.054*  0.035  -0.038 
  [0.076] [0.032]  [0.059] [0.028]  [0.059] [0.028]  [0.053] [0.029] 
Trade openness  -0.98*** -0.019  -0.63**  -0.16  -0.55** -0.098  -0.80***  -0.35** 
  [0.33] [0.14]  [0.28] [0.14]  [0.28] [0.14]  [0.28] [0.16] 
Real exchange rate (lag)  -1.99*** -0.25*  -1.11*** -0.16  -1.05*** -0.12  -1.09*** -0.33** 
  [0.34] [0.15]  [0.28] [0.14]  [0.28] [0.14]  [0.27] [0.16] 
Log(FPI/FDI), lag   0.84***   0.84***   0.83***   0.71*** 
   [0.020]   [0.022]   [0.022]   [0.023] 
Prob of liquidity crisis at t+1  -6.58** -0.82  -4.26*  -2.20*  -10.4***  -6.23***  -10.3***  -3.75* 
  [2.87] [1.18]  [2.55] [1.26]  [3.44] [1.70]  [3.59] [2.04] 
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(CIFAR)  0.22*** 0.041          
  [0.077] [0.032]          
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(ACC)     0.13* 0.072*       
     [0.075] [0.037]       
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(OPA)        0.25*** 0.15***    
        [0.079] [0.039]    
Prob(crisis)*Opacity(GCR)           3.28*** 1.21* 
           [1.13] [0.64] 
Observations  487 449  542 494  542 494  614 558 
Number of countries  34 34  40 40  40 40  47 47 
R-squared  0.26   0.16   0.17   0.18  
 
Note: The estimated probability of liquidity crisis is based on the estimates from Table 3 (Case 2). The dependent variable is 
the log of FPI stock over FDI stock for source countries from 1985 to 2004. The Overall Opacity Index (OPA) and the 
Accounting (ACC) Opacity Index are constructed in 2004 by Kurtzman Group. The opacity index (CIFAR, 1993) is from the 
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. The opacity index (GCR, 1999) is from the annual Global 
Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum. All other explanatory variables are from the WDI. Standard errors in 
brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.     
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Table 9: Determinants of FPI over FDI-Opacity 
(With Actual Occurrence of Liquidity Crisis) 
 
   CIFAR ACC  OPA  GCR 
Log(FPI/FDI), lag  0.84***  0.84***  0.84***  0.71*** 
 [0.020]  [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.026] 
Population, log  -1.11***  -0.62  -0.54  -1.70*** 
 [0.39]  [0.44]  [0.44]  [0.57] 
GDP per capita, log  -0.55**  -0.24  -0.25  -0.41* 
 [0.22]  [0.20]  [0.20]  [0.24] 
Stock market capitalization/GDP  -0.081*** -0.067**  -0.068**  -0.03 
 [0.030]  [0.027]  [0.027]  [0.029] 
Trade openness  -0.051  -0.13  -0.15  -0.36** 
 [0.12]  [0.12]  [0.12]  [0.15] 
Liquidity Crises, one-period ahead  -0.34*  0.06  -0.76***  -0.35 
 [0.19]  [0.22]  [0.27]  [0.33] 
Liquidity crisis (t+1)*Opacity(CIFAR)  0.012**       
 [0.0057]       
Liquidity crisis (t+1)*Opacity(ACC)    -0.00085     
   [0.0062]     
Liquidity crisis (t+1)*Opacity(OPA)      0.019***   
     [0.0064]   
Liquidity crisis (t+1)*Opacity(GCR)        0.14 
       [0.11] 
Observations 449  492  492  561 
Number of countries  34  41  41  51 
 
Note: The actual liquidity crisis is used in the estimation.  The dependent variable is the log of FPI 
stock over FDI stock for source countries over the period from 1985 to 2004. The Overall Opacity 
Index (OPA) and the Accounting (ACC) Opacity Index are constructed in 2004 by Kurtzman 
Group. The opacity index (CIFAR, 1993) is from the Center for International Financial Analysis 
and Research. The opacity index (GCR, 1999) is from the annual Global Competitiveness Report 
by the World Economic Forum. All other explanatory variables are from the WDI. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 1: Opacity Index- CIFAR 
 
Argentina  32 
Australia  20 
Austria  38 
Belgium  32 
Brazil  44 
Canada  25 
Switzerland  20 
Chile  22 
Colombia  42 
Germany  33 
Denmark  25 
Spain  28 
Finland  17 
France  22 
United Kingdom  15 
Greece  39 
Hong Kong  27 
India  39 
Ireland  19 
Israel  26 
Italy  34 
Japan  29 
Korea  32 
Sri Lanka  26 
Mexico  29 
Malaysia  21 
Nigeria  30 
Netherlands  26 
Norway  25 
New Zealand  20 
Pakistan  27 
Philippines  36 
Portugal  44 
Singapore  21 
Sweden  17 
Thailand  34 
Turkey  42 
Taiwan  42 
United States  24 
South Africa  21 
Zimbabwe  28 
Note: CIFAR (1995) is  from the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research. We use 100 minus the original CIFAR transparency index to get the 
CIFAR opacity index 
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Appendix Table 2: Opacity Index- Kurtzman et al (2004) 
Country  ACC  OPA  Country  ACC  OPA  Country  ACC  OPA 
Finland    17 13  Argentina    30 44 Taiwan    40  34 
Belgium    17 23  India    30 48 Brazil    40  40 
Germany    17 25  Venezuela    30 51 Poland    40  41 
USA    20 21  UK  33 19 Russia    40  46 
Canada    20 23  Denmark   33 19 Egypt    40  48 
Chile   20  29  Hong Kong   33  20  Czech Rep   44  41 
Israel    20 30  Australia   33 21 Turkey    44  43 
Thailand    20 35  Austria    33 23 Lebanon   44  59 
Japan   22  28  S. Africa   33  34  Singapore   50  24 
Indonesia    22 59  France    33 37 Spain    50  34 
Sweden    25 19  Mexico    33 44 Portugal   50  35 
Switzerland    25 23  Pakistan   33 45 Hungary   50  36 
Ecuador   25  42  Saudi Arabia   33  46  Greece   50  41 
Colombia    29 43  Philippines    33 50 China    56  50 
Malaysia    30 35  Netherlands    38 24 Italy    63  43 
Korea   30  37  Ireland   38  26          
 
Note: The Overall Opacity Index (OPA) was constructed in 2004 by Kurtzman, Yago and Phumiwasana (2004), following the 
methodology of PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001) Opacity Index. It covers corruption (COR), efficacy of the legal system (LEG), 
deleterious economic policy (ENF), inadequate accounting and governance practices (ACC), and detrimental regulatory structures 
(REG). The higher is the index, the higher is the opacity. 
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Appendix Table 3: Opacity Index-GCR 
 
Argentina  2.91  Japan                 2.75 
Australia             1.82  Jordan  2.84 
Austria  2.06  Korea  3.27 
Belgium  2.24  Luxembourg  2.44 
Bolivia               4.38  Malaysia              2.79 
Brazil  2.91  Mauritius  2.89 
Bulgaria              3.51  Mexico  2.66 
Canada                1.84  Netherlands  2.2 
Chile  1.99  New Zealand           1.88 
China,P.R.: Mainland  4.29  Norway  2.04 
China,P.R.:Hong Kong  2.81  Peru  2.97 
Colombia  3.15  Philippines  3.17 
Costa Rica            3.46  Poland                2.8 
Czech Republic  3.71  Portugal  2.67 
Denmark               2  Russia  4.41 
Ecuador  4.47  Singapore             2.37 
Egypt                 3.35  Slovak Republic       4.12 
El Salvador           3.98  South Africa          2.48 
Finland  1.58  Spain  2.23 
France  2.26  Sweden  1.69 
Germany  2.39  Switzerland           2.65 
Greece  2.85  Thailand  3.35 
Hungary               3.05  Turkey  2.97 
Iceland               2.85  Ukraine  2.22 
India  3.07  United Kingdom        1.74 
Indonesia             4.13  United States  1.59 
Ireland  2.62  Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  3.88 
Israel                2.58  Vietnam  4.1 
Italy  2.83  Zimbabwe              2.78 
 
Note: The opacity index (GCR, 1999) is  from the annual Global Competitiveness Report produced by the 
World Economic Forum. We use 8 minus the original index as our proxy of opacity. 
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Appendix Table 4: Correlation Among Opacity Indexes 
  
 OPA  ACC  CIFAR  GCR 
OPA 1     
ACC 0.37  1      
CIFAR 0.68 0.33  1     
GCR  0.78  0.24 0.65 1 
 